investigation. The article reaches three main conclusions. First, the effects of religiosity on democratic attitudes are direct and pronounced. Higher levels of religiosity are associated with higher levels of regime support and lower levels of support for democracy. Second, age and education indirectly effect support for democracy through satisfaction with regime performance.
Finally, popular discontent with regime performance is strongly and positively correlated with support for democracy.
Measuring Support for Democracy
A common approach to measuring popular support for democracy in cross-national survey research is to construct an index variable based on several generic questions. WVS includes questions about the democratic performance (i.e., whether democracies are good at maintaining order, etc.) and ideals (i.e., approval of democracy and its superiority to other forms of government). When measured by these indicators, support for democracy in Muslim-majority countries is as widespread as in other countries (Tessler 2002; Hofmann 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004, 146) . At the same time, a growing body of literature addresses the problems associated with measuring support for democracy in cross-national surveys. Concepts may have different meanings in different countries (Przeworski and Teune 1966, 552) and the assumption that democracy can be measured by the same items in every culture is not always sustainable (Heath, Fisher, and Smith 2005, 320-1; Heath, Martin, and Spreckelsen 2009) . Different actors may use the term for different purposes, ranging from expressing an amorphous political ideal to legitimizing their political interests. Confronting this issue is essential to avoid the problem of measurement error, "the discrepancy between respondents' attributes and their survey response" (Groves 1987, S162) .
Measuring support for democracy in abstract terms may lead to misleading inferences given democracy's universal appeal. The respondents are likely to evaluate democracy as a better political system than alternatives regardless of what they understand from the concept. Not surprisingly, the level of popular support for democracy is not a good predictor of a country's level of democratic achievement (Inglehart 2003; Fails and Pierce 2010 ). An alternative strategy may be to ask respondents to evaluate the level of democracy in their own country. A commonly used survey item is, "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?" Yet, it is not clear what this and Sarsfield 2007: 638-40) . First, survey respondents may give socially desirable answers to avoid any risks in political contexts where people are not permitted to speak their mind freely (Kuechler 1998: 193) . Next, citizens in countries with no democratic history do not have the opportunity to compare the advantages and disadvantages associated with different regimes.
From a rational choice perspective, citizens would support democracy if they think democratic regimes are better in producing economic (i.e., more growth and employment) and political (i.e., more protection for human rights) goods (Evans and Whitefield 1995) . Yet citizens in authoritarian countries lack a performance-based criterion of democracy emanating from their experiences. They would be less likely to have "an instrumental, performance-driven attitude based on an appreciation of what democracy does (or fails to do)" (Mattes and Bratton 2007, 201) . Third, popular understanding of and expectations from democracy would be more shallow and incoherent in authoritarian settings (Miller, Hesli and Reisinger 1997) . For instance, respondents who do not necessarily endorse practices associated with democratic rule such as the sanctity of human rights for unpopular dissidents may appear strong endorsers of democracy (Gibson 1998) . Similarly, citizens in authoritarian countries may have unrealistic expectations from democracy such as associating democratic rule with superior economic performance rather than free elections (Jamal and Tessler 2008) .
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 shows the relationship between popular perceptions of army takeover and the level of democracy in 48 countries for which data from the fifth wave of the World Values Surveys are available. The respondents are asked whether they consider army takeover when incumbent government is incompetent as an essential characteristic of democracy. The y-axis of the figure shows the percentage of the respondents in each country who say that army takeover is an essential characteristic of democracy (giving scores from 6 to 10). The x-axis provides the ten-year average democracy score for each country, which are calculated by adding Freedom House' political liberties and civil rights scores for the 10 years prior to the survey year in that country. The scores that range from 0 to 120 are reversed so that higher values indicate higher levels of democratic rule. The relationship between two variables is strong (correlation = -0.55).
Respondents in less democratic countries are more likely to associate army takeover with democracy when they perceive government as incompetent than respondents in living in democratic countries. This intriguing finding can be interpreted in two different ways. First, people under authoritarian rule may have more superficial understandings of democracy than people living in democratic regimes. They correctly argue that democracy is about people choosing their leaders in free elections and civil rights protecting people against oppression. For instance, 93 percent of respondents in Vietnam, 89 percent in Jordan, 86 percent in Egypt, and 77 percent in Iraq think that civil rights are an essential characteristic of democracy. Yet a majority of respondents in these countries also think army takeover would not necessarily undermine democratic rule. Next, people under authoritarian rule may not have a clear understanding of army rule, which may lack a universal meaning. So the measurement error is not just about the concept of democracy, but also about the concept of army takeover. In any case, the graph clearly reveals that measuring support for democracy in authoritarian countries needs carefully constructed measurements. In the light of this discussion, the following sections offer two strategies to measure support for democracy in Iran. represents the most dynamic, diverse, and educated segment of the Iranian population. Tehran receives immigrants from all over the country. In a sense, it provides a microcosm for studying diversity and plurality of political opinions in Iran. Moreover, a series of demonstrations following the 2009 presidential elections show the centrality of the capital to political struggles in Iran. A group of university students, who were supervised by scholars from the University of Tehran, were trained to conduct face-to-face interviews in respondents' main residences in Persian. In this regard, this survey is different from several recent surveys that rely on telephone interviews, which create serious reliability problems in a country where face-to-face communication is central to the establishment of rapport and trust in personal relations. The survey is based on multistage area probability sampling. The Tehran municipality, with a population of around 7.5 million, is divided into five zones reflecting different income levels based on the information obtained from the Statistical Center of Iran. The number of interviews in each of the primary sampling units (PSU) is then determined according to the populations of these units. Finally, housing units and respondents are randomly chosen in PSUs.
Measuring Support for Democracy in Iran
While Iran does not qualify as a democracy according to the Freedom House and Polity IV Project, the Iranian political system combines authoritarian forms of government with democratic elements such as highly contested yet unfair elections. Moreover, public debates about the nature and merits of democratic rule have been central to Iranian politics at least since the late 1990s. Major Iranian political actors have loaded the term democracy with competing and contradictory meanings (Gheissari and Nasr 2006) . For the reformist movement that rose with the victory of Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential elections, democracy signifies quest for societal and individual freedoms, political pluralism and restrictions on the arbitrary state authority (Vahdat 2005; Kamrava 2008, 151-5) . The reformists claim that the current political system has major democratic deficits and demand a major overhaul of the regime's institutional structure. In particular, they are highly critical of the extensive powers of the institutions (i.e., the office of faqih, the Guardians Council, special courts) that lack popular accountability. Yet Mahmoud Ahmedinejad who became president in 2005 and won a second term after a highly disputed contest in 2009 is dismissive of demands for greater democracy (Azimi 2008, 380-411 Finally, the last rows of Table 2 focus on an index variable combining substantive and procedural understandings of democracy based on factor analysis. Factor analysis using maximum-likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation is conducted to identify the common dimension underlying substantive and procedural understandings of democracy in Iran. Factor analysis reveals that Iranians associate democracy with free elections, civil rights, economic prosperity, and social welfare state (the last two are examples of substantive understandings of democracy). Index validity is high as the factor analysis extracts a single unrotated factor with an [ Table 3 about here]
Studies of support for democracy in other contexts suggest that popular perceptions of the level of democracy in a country may be a function of the satisfaction with what the regime delivers (Bratton and Mattes 2001, 457; Mattes and Bratton 2007, 194, fn.3) . By this logic, respondents indicate their dissatisfaction with regime performance when they characterize Iran as undemocratic and vice versa. In fact, an overwhelming majority of Iranian have positive understandings of democratic rule (e.g., according to the 2005 Iranian WVS, 91 percent of respondents characterize having a democratic system as either very good or fairly good). Table 3 empirically substantiates this proposition. Respondents who do not have confidence in the government are much more likely to consider Iran as being not democratic than respondents who have confidence in the government.
These preliminary findings suggest that a valid measure of popular support for democracy in Iran should indicate more than dissatisfaction with the ruling regime. In other words, respondents who combine a minimum understanding of democracy with an awareness that they live under less than a fully democratic regime should be distinguished from respondents who are critical of the regime but lack an understanding of democracy. For this purpose, a measure was created based on two items. The first item is based on a single question, "In your opinion, how much democracy exists in Iran? It ranges from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much exists).
As Table 3 democracy. This percentage is significantly lower than the percentage in Indonesia but higher than the percentages in most of the African countries (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, 66) .Two students at the University of Tehran who are native Persian speakers separately coded definitions offered by respondents into eight different criteria, which are free speech, popular rule, social justice, political equality, civic freedoms, pluralism, law and order, and the current political system. Free speech was by far the most popular response (36 percent). Intercoder reliability was very high (97.6 percent). The responses that were coded differently are assigned into categories that combine two criteria (e.g., popular rule and social justice, free speech and social justice, etc.). These two items, the level of democracy in Iran and respondent definitions of democracy, were combined to generate a binary dependent variable that measures support for democracy in Iran. Respondents who came up with positive and conventional understandings of democracy and characterize Iran having to a limited degree, little or no democracy are assigned a score of 1 (n = 316). Positive and conventional understandings of democracy include the first six criteria. Other respondents were assigned a score of 0 (n = 202). This binary valuable focuses on respondents who both identify a core meaning of democracy and express criticism of the current regime. It acknowledges that views that are only mildly critical of the Iranian political system can be pro-democratic as long as they exhibit a basic understanding of the term. It establishes a minimum criterion for an objective definition of democracy and does not devalue the plurality and diversity characterizing Iranian views of democracy. Besides, it differentiates respondents who espouse democratic rule from respondents who are only discontented with the government since the former group is the primary focus of this study. The latter includes respondents who do not offer positive and conventional definitions of democracy but sees little or no democracy in Iran. They can be hardcore Islamists who think the ruling regime betrays its revolutionary principles. Similarly, respondents who have positive and conventional understandings of democracy but perceive Iran as democratic are also categorized as non-democrats since they are content with the status quo and do not demand greater democratization in Iran.
Political Attitudes
It is important to make an analytical distinction among support for the ruling ideology, regime performance, and incumbent (Norris 1999 ). An Iranian citizen can be highly critical of how the country is ruled while remaining loyal to the principles of the Islamic Republic that entail the notion of velayat-e faqih-the rule of the jurist, the Islamization of legal system, and the state enforcement of religious norms (Tezcür & Azadarmaki 2008) . Similarly, support for the ruling ideology may not indicate that a person is content with the democratic achievements of the current political system. Citizens who are critical of the ruling ideology may come from significantly different demographic groups than citizens who demand greater democracy.
Satisfaction with regime performance in Iran was indirectly measured by the question of how accountable the Iranian political system is to the people in the absence of a better measurement. Support for the ruling ideology was measured by a composite variable based on four items: whether politics should be in union with religion, how important it is for the state to ensure that people's morals are in line with religion, how important it is for the state to ensure that social order is line with Islamic laws, and whether the influence of religious leaders in politics is useful for the society (Eigenvalue of 1.72 produced by factor analysis using maximum-likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation). The items loadings are .59, .71, .72, and .60, respectively. Cronbach's α of .73 indicates a relatively high level of reliability. The KMO is .68, which is an acceptable level of commonness. In light of the previous findings, it is expected that satisfaction with regime performance is negatively related with support for democracy in Iran. 
Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors
Scholars studying public opinion in authoritarian settings show that age and education are significantly related to political attitudes and behavior. More specifically, younger people with higher education are most likely to challenge the authoritarian system and oppose its policies (Geddes & Zaller 1989, 333; Chen, Zhong and Hillard 1997, 56, 58; Zhong and Chen 2002: 707) . Similarly, studies of Iranian politics argue that educated, young, and middle-class Iranians are the primary demographic group demanding greater democratization (Ansari 2000, 92-4, 116-18; Brumberg 2001, 234; Amuzeger 2003; Keddie 2003, 270; Khosrokhavar 2004, 75; Gheissari & Nasr 2006, 129; Abrahamian 2008, 186) . Similarly, Kurzman (2008, 321) argues, "Today's generation of young, educated women has attitudes and behaviors that are significantly different from other Iranians." It may be the case that young educated women are particularly supportive of democracy. To directly test these propositions, two binary variables were created: a variable that assigns 1 to respondents who are younger than thirty-five years of age with at least twelve years of education and 0 to others, and another variable assigning 1 to respondents who are female and younger than thirty-five years of age with at least twelve years of education and 0 to others. Finally, it can be argued that access to satellite TV, which increases exposure to oppositional and international broadcasts, is likely to translate into a higher awareness of and support for democracy.
Hypothesis 3: Educated youth in general, and educated young women in particular, are more supportive of democracy and critical of regime performance than other demographic groups.
Hypothesis 4: Citizens with access to satellite TV are more likely to exhibit support for democracy than citizens without satellite TV.
Another hypothesis considers the impact of class identification and financial satisfaction on political attitudes (Keddie 2003, 291; Gheissari and Nasr 2006, 148; Abrahamian 2008, 194; Azimi 2008, 402) . Given the lasting legacy of populism in the Islamic Republic, class differences may not necessarily result in significantly different political attitudes (Abrahamian 1993, 17, 133) . Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with one's current income is likely to lead negative evaluations of regime performance and higher support for democracy. Table 4 shows results of the multivariate regression, each with separate dependent variables: satisfaction with regime performance, support for the ruling ideology, and satisfaction with the level of democracy in Iran. It also demonstrates the results of a logistic regression for support of democracy. Multicollineraity is not a serious problem in the analyses. Only the educated youth variable in the democracy in Iran model has a VIF score slightly more than 3 (3.02 to be precise).
Statistical Analyses and Findings
Available evidence provides partial support to hypotheses 3 and 5. Statistical analyses demonstrate that females, educated respondents, educated youth, and respondents dissatisfied with their income are less satisfied with regime performance than other demographic groups.
Consistent with the theoretical expectations and previous findings, satisfaction with regime performance is positively associated with support for the ruling ideology, satisfaction with democracy in Iran and negatively with support for democracy. Since female, young, and educated respondents have lower levels satisfaction with regime performance, they may be more supportive of democracy. Similarly, the effects of financial satisfaction on attitudes toward democracy may be meditated through its influence on satisfaction with regime performance. The effects of satellite TV access on attitudes toward democracy are more straightforward.
Respondents who have access to satellite TV are less satisfied with the level of democracy in Iran and more supportive of democracy than other respondents.
[ Table 4 around here]
One of the most consistent findings in the statistical analyses concerns the effects of religiosity on political attitudes. Religious respondents who frequently attend Friday prayers exhibit higher levels of satisfaction with regime performance and the level of democracy in Iran and support for ruling ideology than respondents who do not participate in prayers. Furthermore, more religious people are less likely to be supportive of democracy. These findings support Hypothesis 6.
Respondents who are dissatisfied with regime performance are also more critical of the ruling ideology, more dissatisfied with the level of democracy in Iran, and more supportive of democracy than other respondents. This finding corroborates Table 3 [ Table 5 about here] The findings regarding gender, age, education and financial satisfaction necessitates an analysis that differentiates between direct and indirect effects of these demographic variables on support for democracy. These variables seem to indirectly affect support for democracy through their effects on satisfaction with regime. Table 5 presents results from a logit model that estimates direct and indirect effects of different demographic characteristics on support for democracy controlling for other independent variables (for more information on this model, see Buis 2010) . Consistent with the previous findings, none of the direct effects are significant.
Indirect effects of education, educated youth and financial dissatisfaction are significant. To elaborate, respondents with only middle school or less education (low education category) would have 1.21 times higher odds of supporting democracy if they had the same level of dissatisfaction with regime performance as respondents with at least twelve years of education (high education category). While the respondents in high education category would have 1.71 times higher odds of supporting democracy than respondents in low education category when they exhibited similar levels of dissatisfaction with regime performance, this effect is not significant. This indicates education does not have any direct effect on support for democracy and its effect is mediated through satisfaction with regime performance. Similarly, groups other than educated youth would have 1.13 times higher odds of supporting democracy if they had the same level of dissatisfaction with regime performance as educated youth. Finally, respondents who are financially very satisfied would have a 0.82 times higher odds of supporting democracy if they had the same level of dissatisfaction with regime performance as financially nonsatisfied respondents.
[ Table 6 about here]
The Tehran survey does not provide any systematic information about Iranians outside of the capital city. To address this issue, Table 6 shows the results of three multivariate regressions based on the Iranian WVS, each with separate dependent variables: satisfaction with regime performance, satisfaction with the level of democracy and support for democracy. As in the previous analysis, the support for democracy variable combines both positive and conventional understandings of democracy and the level of democracy in Iran. As discussed above, Iranians associate democracy with four characteristics. Two are procedural-free elections, civil rights; two are substantive-economic prosperity and social welfare state. Respondents who identify these factors as essential characteristics of democracy and are mildly or strongly critical of the level of democracy in Iran (scores of 7 or lower in a scale of 1-10) were assigned a score of 1 (n = 1,872). All other respondents are assigned a score of 0 (n = 747).
Two variables are used to measure attitudinal religiosity. First a composite variable based on the four items was created: whether mosques give adequate answers to moral, family life, spiritual, and social problems. Factor analysis using maximum-likelihood extraction and direct oblimin rotation produces a single unrotated factor for these four items with an Eigenvalue of 1.90. The items loadings are .76, .70, .68, and .60 respectively. Both Cronbach's α and KMO are .78. Second, the question of confidence in mosques is included in the analysis. An item measuring the frequency of attendance in mosque prayers was used to measure behavioral religiosity. Satisfaction with regime performance was measured by the confidence in the government. The influence of religious leaders' in governmental affairs is a proxy variable to measure support for the ruling ideology. Finally, a dummy variable that assigns 1 to interviews conducted in Tehran and 0 to interviews elsewhere was generated.
The WVS survey was administrated from June 1 to August 1, 2005, around two and half years before the Tehran survey was completed and during and in the immediate aftermath of the presidential elections that resulted in the victory of Ahmedinejad. Despite this difference in the timing of the surveys, and significant differences in the questionnaire and measurements, statistical results from both surveys are remarkably similar. Expectedly, higher levels of satisfaction with regime performance strongly correlate with lower levels of support for democracy and higher levels of satisfaction with the level of democracy in Iran. The coefficients of gender, age, education, and class identification are insignificant as direct predictors of support for democracy. As in the Tehran survey, higher levels of education translate into higher levels of discontent with regime performance, which is in turn associated with higher support for democracy. Partially different from the Tehran survey results, lower levels of financial satisfaction directly translates into less satisfaction with democracy in Iran and higher support for democracy. Attitudinal religiosity and mosque attendance are significantly and negatively correlated with support for democracy, and significantly and positively with satisfaction with regime performance and democracy in Iran. Finally, support for the ruling ideology and endorsement of religious leaders' influence are associated with higher satisfaction with regime performance and lower support for democracy. The nationwide analysis also reveals an important distinction between Tehran and the rest of Iran. It seems that dissatisfaction with regime performance spreads out evenly in the country. Yet Iranians residing in larger cities, especially in Tehran, are more likely to espouse prodemocratic attitudes than Iranians elsewhere.
Discussion
Measuring support for democracy in authoritarian contexts presents unique challenges and necessitates more nuanced approaches to survey data than usually found in the literature.
Particularly important is the mismatch between the conventional understandings and popular perceptions of democracy. Meanings attached to democracy may exhibit significant crosscultural and within-culture differences. If researchers remain insensitive to these differences, they are likely to reach invalid conclusions about popular support for democracy in authoritarian regimes. This article, which presents the first systematic study of democratic attitudes in Iran, Second, the statistical results provide support to the common wisdom that educated youth is particularly dissatisfied with regime performance. In Tehran, educated young people exhibit greater discontent with regime performance, which is strongly associated with higher levels of support for democracy. In this sense, educated people in general, and educated youth in particular, become advocates of greater democratization not because they naturally hold more democratic views but primarily because they tend to be more critical of the ruling regime.
Moreover, geographical location clearly shapes political attitudes of Iranians. The findings from the nationally representative WVS sample suggest that support for democracy is considerably higher in Tehran than in provinces even if geographical location does not affect satisfaction with the level of democracy in Iran. This may reflect the large scope of civic activism and political unrest in Tehran. Additionally, the positive impact of satellite TV on support for democracy can be interpreted in two ways. On one hand, it may be a proxy for some unobserved variables in the sense that Iranians already committed to democracy are also more likely to obtain satellite TV. This reasoning is plausible especially since satellite TV access is not significantly associated with regime dissatisfaction. On the other hand, it may directly shape political attitudes as Iranians watching satellite TV programs are exposed to ideas critical of the ruling regime and calling for greater democracy in the country.
Finally, popular perceptions of regime performance strongly correlate with democratic attitudes. Satisfaction with the level of Iranian democracy serves as a proxy variable for satisfaction with what the regime delivers. This finding and the negative relationship between financial satisfaction and support for democracy is very similar to the findings in other developing countries (Geddes 1999, 140) . As an authoritarian regime experiences economic problems and fail to meet the needs of its citizens, it is likely to confront greater demands for democratization. In Iran, citizens who are critical of regime performance are more likely to espouse prodemocratic views than citizens who are content with what the regime delivers. As briefly mentioned above, the direction of causality is likely to be bidirectional. Citizens with higher levels of awareness and support for democratic rule are naturally more likely to be more critical of the regime than citizens with weak democratic commitments. At the same time, poor regime performance is likely to transform popular preferences and generate greater demands for democratic rule among Iranian citizens in Tehran. There is more support for the second causal dynamic since young and educated Iranians, who are generally perceived as the main agents of progressive political change, exhibit more support for democracy than older and less educated Iranians only if they are dissatisfied with regime performance. Education does not directly cultivate prodemocratic views but contributes to a more critical attitude toward political authority, consistent with one of the core expectations of modernization theory.
30. Could you offer your own definition of the term democracy in a sentence? 39. Do you agree with the following statement? "Our politics should be in union with our religion." (1) I agree (2) I don't have an opinion (3) I disagree.
40. In your opinion, how important that the state fulfills the following tasks? Choose "most important," "second important," "third important," or "a little important."
The state should ensure that religion and people's morals are harmonious.
The state should ensure that social order is line with Islamic laws. Table shows observed odds ratios, and bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Each row compares two demographic groups to each other: Indirect effects are mediated through satisfaction with regime performance. Stata command is ldecomp (Buis 2010) . Only the results from the first method are showed as they are very similar to the results from the second method.*Significantly different than zero at the .05 level. **Significantly different than zero at the .01 level. 
